Interceptor drones, electronic warfare, SpaceX: how the Ukrainian Armed Forces tackle hundreds of "Shaheds" – an interview with Flash.

Is the national EW system "Pokrov" being strengthened to combat "Shaheds"?

We are discussing a category of EW that operates based on signals from satellite navigation, which means, figuratively speaking, it either replaces these signals or prevents them from functioning. Such systems against "Shaheds" are effective only if there are many of them and they are evenly distributed across the territory. It is necessary for a "Shahed," whose navigation system is protected, to lose navigation when entering this area.

Yes, we are continuing to install this system; of course, it's a large, global, and costly process. Unfortunately, our adversary is also not standing still, seeking methods to circumvent it and to act in various situations. For instance, previously, a "Shahed" entering the EW zone could not find a target to attack, but now it has become smarter. It even leaves its primary target and flies towards another, backup target that may potentially be unprotected by EW systems.

It is extremely difficult to prove that a "Shahed" was downed specifically due to EW measures. We do not know how statistics are compiled. We often see data labeled "location lost," and I frequently get asked what this means and how it comes about. It's hard to say whether it's due to EW operations, mere coincidence, or if the "Gerbera" simply ran out of fuel and crashed. We cannot definitively determine that a "Shahed" was shot down exclusively by EW systems.

What is your assessment of the prospects for interceptor drones in the fight against "Shaheds"? For example, the well-known team "Wild Hornets" recently presented their new tools resembling a bullet.

So far, I remain quite skeptical because we first saw this concept at a hackathon on "Shaheds" more than a year ago. The idea is straightforward: to attack "Shaheds" with faster drones, but we do not see anyone doing this. It is a rather complex process for several reasons.

Firstly, sufficient speed is needed to catch up with "Shaheds" (this issue has already been addressed). Secondly, there must be enough flight time to pursue them. Additionally, there needs to be a sufficient number of these UAVs scattered across various locations, always in standby mode and ready to take off and intercept a "Shahed."

In other words, a comprehensive set of measures is required. This can be done, but somehow the "Shahed" needs to be tracked, fixed, guided, and assisted in reaching its target. We have learned to combat enemy reconnaissance UAVs with anti-aircraft drones, thanks to the fact that they are slow, fly very statically, and predictably. We guide FPV drones and approach from above. In the case of "Shaheds," especially those flying at night, visual searches with anti-aircraft drones are often impossible, unlike during the day. I do not rule out that we may reach that point.

Is SpaceX involved in the process of blocking Starlink used by Russia in any way?

This is a complex issue. Of course, based on our official requests, especially if we do this through our partners, SpaceX responds to such inquiries. However, it is very challenging to determine and prove which Starlinks are being used for what purpose, as we simply do not have that information. Yes, we can find Starlink components in the wreckage, gather data, and determine where and by whom it was purchased. But this is not grounds for completely blocking the dealer or seller and everything they have sold.

For example, a Starlink purchased by a volunteer in Poland and installed on a Ukrainian UAV, as well as a Starlink bought by a relative in Germany, given to a Russian, and also operating in Ukraine — SpaceX cannot discern which one we are using and which one the adversaries are using. There are no options here. If we analyze the traffic from Starlink and draw conclusions based on it, that is not a solution — VPNs are raised, and a closed tunnel is created through any European country, making it impossible to see what information is being transmitted. We understand that it is difficult to act against Starlink, but such work is underway. This involves tracking global dealers who supply equipment to the Russian Federation through affiliated companies, not in units but in hundreds.

For instance, if a Starlink is bought in the United Arab Emirates and suddenly ends up on the eastern front in Ukraine, questions arise. It is clear that such a dealer can be tracked, blocked, and other sanctions can be imposed to prevent them from selling to Russians further. But until we take the initiative, SpaceX will not take any action in this direction. Similarly, Starlink operates in occupied territories since SpaceX officially considers them to be part of Ukraine. This includes Crimea, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and the Southeast. Wherever combat operations are taking place, Starlink operates, regardless of whether it is with us or the Russians.

What promising directions do you see for combating "Shaheds"?

During the time that the war has been ongoing, everything that could be conceived has already been thought of. Nothing better can be devised than to await the emergence of FPV drones capable of catching up with and attacking "Shaheds" to become our new weapon. Because we can increase the number of mobile fire groups, although they are already quite sufficient across the country. They are not always effective, as we see that "Shaheds" sometimes fly at altitudes of 3-4 kilometers over Ukraine and descend just before the attack. Here, mobile fire groups are useless (except for those guarding specific sites).

We can ask our partners to provide more air defense systems to combat "Shaheds," but that means depending on someone else again, which is an unstable option. Therefore, I advocate for finding our own solutions. FPV drones could be our own solution.

Do you know anything about the fate of the system called "Shahed Catcher," to which Ukrainians donated 152 million hryvnias in 2022-2023?

I have not heard anything about it, although such ideas were voiced at the same hackathon. There were drones that shoot threads and nets. There were many UAVs that chase and shoot down targets. But at the moment, as we can see, the practically only effective means against "Shaheds" are the MOD and air defense systems.